Authentication insiders have been privately wondering if Apple Corporation realizes that its iPhone has become a critical 'reader' for the authentication process. Several suppliers of authentication systems have opted for writing iPhone 'apps' rather than develop their own internet interfaces. They have argued that there is little point in developing proprietary readers when cell phones are now equipped with good cameras, can easily read barcodes, data matrices and other security features and are already in the pockets of most examiners, including members of the public.

It seems that Apple appears content to allow others to use and profit from its devices for authentication purposes while telecoms giant Nokia, on the other hand, has become a significant player in the authentication arena. In this issue, we detail the advances being made by Nokia in the authentication business through its involvement in the new Original1 joint venture. Nokia has been an active user of authentication technology for several years now. Not only can its genuine batteries be identified by holographic labels but the phones themselves are now equipped for RFID compatibility which means that, amongst other things, they can read the passive chips on the battery packaging.

Similarly, ProofTag, Univocal Sign, SixTrue are just some of the systems that use, or create, random numbers and require the use of smart phones to authenticate the product to which they are attached. More correctly, these phone-based systems confirm that the label, tag or packaging associated with the product has a legitimate history. These hand-held readers rely on the assumption that if the external packaging is authentic, the probability is that the contents are genuine also.

But couple this with the other hand held readers described in our October issue which, in effect, have reduced complex analytical technology to the size of a neat, hand-held device and you have a system for authenticating the contents in addition to the packaging. Using Raman or near infrared spectrophotometry for organic substances, or X-ray fluorescence (XRF) for inorganics, analyses that normally require laboratory equipment managed by highly skilled operators used to take days. Now, field operators or warehouse foremen can carry out the same determinations in minutes, on site. The operation is akin to testing a person's DNA instead of examining their passport. If governments had their way, people would probably be subject to the same molecular scrutiny but the political ramifications which deter that level of personal intrusion do not apply to objects.

This is especially critical in the world of pharmaceuticals where lives, in addition to profits, are at stake. So it is not a surprise that it is in pharmaceutical authentication that these systems have made the most immediate inroads.

So Is Digital All That's Needed

Putting these two major developments of 2010 together, one is bound to ask if it makes sense for any company to offer authentication features that do not make use of digital technology. Several years ago, vendors of security labels could obtain sales of what were considered uncopiable features which imbued brand owners with a sense of comfort that their product was now 'protected'. Of course, everyone soon learned that there is no such thing as 'uncopiable' (as we put it in an early Authentication News editorial, 'if you can make it, they can fake it'), so the more aware suppliers refined their sales pitch and conceded that there is no 'silver bullet' and their product could be part of an anti-counterfeiting mix. Nowadays the talk is of 'layered security' by which is meant overt, covert and forensic approaches all being seen as working complementarily as part of the authentication mix.

Even these terms are now becoming outmoded as the direction appears to be moving towards removing the subjectivity from authentication and replacing it with the certainty of digital recognition. Terms such as '128 bit encryption', 'G4 connectivity' and 'data vault security' give the warm comfort that someone, somewhere knows what they are talking about (although we, ourselves, don't feel that we are part of that knowledgeable group).

Don't Throw Out the Authentication Baby

But there is a danger - to use an old British saying - of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. For over 20 years overt authentication products have served their purpose of identifying counterfeit product - albeit the criminals have become more adept at faking the authenticator. Nonetheless, it's not always the wisest move to throw out the old totally, in favour of the new. It pays to be sceptical of the claims for new technologies and to retain the old until the new is proven. 30 years ago holograms were the 'silver bullet', the only thing needed to combat counterfeits; well, they have played, and continue to play, a role, but they are not that silver bullet (despite their usual colour!). Then in the early years of this century radio frequency identification was the new salvation, and that industry lobbied so effectively that the US Food & Drug Administration made the mis-guided decision to back RFID as the way to combat counterfeit medicines; the FDA recognised that it backed RFID prematurely, but there has been no backing for a proven alternative (meanwhile, Malaysia's Meditag® proves its effectiveness in the fight against counterfeits, and Brazil will be launching a similar national pharma label in 2012).

This year digital handheld technology has staked its claim in the world of authentication systems. Of course there will always be a role for the human inspector and his sense of what is genuine or not, especially when the power or batteries fail, or when there is no cellular signal. It would be naive to think the trend towards digitally based technology will be reversed - after all, this trend is not confined to the authentication world. Authentication suppliers and their customers must both come to terms with that, but this does not mean allowing themselves to be seduced by it, nor embracing it at the expense of other, proven, authentication methods. Layering of complementary methods still applies.